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Abstract
Many organizations today are seeking to improve security by implementing multi-factor authentication,
i.e. authentication requiring more than one independent mechanism to prove one’s identity. One-time
passwords in the form of hardware tokens in combination with conventional passwords have emerged
as the predominant means in high security environments to satisfy the independent identification
criteria for strong authentication. However, current popular public one-time passwords solutions such
as HOTP, mOTP, TOTP, and S/Key depend on the computational complexity of breaking encryption or
hash functions for security. This thesis will present an efficient and information-theoretically secure onetime password system called Shamir-OTP that is based upon secret sharing techniques.

Shamir secret sharing, Proactive secret sharing, Verifiable secret sharing, one-time password, multifactor authentication, password
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Introduction
This thesis’s goal is to introduce a one-time password system that has been derived from techniques
initially developed to implement secret sharing. The advantages and disadvantages of such a system will
be described and compared to other current password systems. An appendix is included that describes
multiple implementations and how to use them.

Background
Before being presented, a background of prerequisite topics will be given independently and then
combined into a functional password system.
One Time Passwords
One-time passwords are passwords that are only valid for a single or small number of transactions. This
contrasts with conventional passwords which are valid for many transactions as users are reluctant to
voluntarily change passwords frequently. Since OTPs are only valid for a limited number of uses, an
attacker has a smaller window of time to gain access to resources guarded by such a password because
any previously stolen passwords will likely have become invalid. As with traditional passwords, one-time
passwords are vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks [1]. By observing the OTP before it is successfully
received by the authenticator, an attacker has a valid password. Because of this undesirable property,
both OTPs and conventional passwords must travel securely.
Typically, the one-time password is generated by a hardware device that the person desiring to be
authenticated carries to promote use across many physically distant domains. The hardware implements
an algorithm that generates passwords in a specific manner that the authenticator knows. The hardware
device will often display the password on a small screen for a user to type into the authenticator.
In this hardware based approach, if the hardware or computer that generates the passwords were
stolen, the thief would be able to authenticate himself just by reading the numbers on the display.
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Because of this reason, one-time passwords are often one part of a multi-factor authentication (MFA)
system where two or more independent factors of authentication are used to identify a user. The three
factors consistently considered possible for authentication are something the user knows, something
the user has, and something the user is. Others methods such as someone you know have also been
suggested [2]. The static password satisfies the something you know factor. Being able to enter a valid
OTP implies that you have the password generator; the something you uniquely have factor is satisfied.
Implementing this strategy alleviates the fear of a lost password generator falsely authenticating a
malicious entity.
With the increase in the popularity of mobile cellular phones and personal digital assistants (PDAs),
there have been some attempts to use these devices as a physical OTP generating device. In this case,
the phone or PDA will satisfy the something you uniquely have factor of authentication and the
password it generates shows this. Initially, when these devices were limited in capabilities, the OTP
would be sent to the device as a text-message that the user would then be able input into the system
for authentication. Electronically authenticating for the bank JPMorgan Chase uses this approach along
with a traditional password [3]. As more capable mobile operating systems and devices began to
appear, most modern mobile phones and PDAs are able to generate the OTP themselves and can
completely replace a dedicated hardware device or a text-messaging solution. Recently Google has been
utilizing this approach to enable MFA for all accounts that opt-in [4].
Algorithms generating temporary passwords can be time-based or mathematical-based. Time-based
algorithms generate passwords that are valid for a set period of time before automatically updated by
the algorithm (often a hardware device). Technically, a one-time is a misnomer as a password can be
used multiple times as long as it is within one time period. A hardware device of this type typically
always displays a password, and the password is constantly changing. The length of time that an OTP is
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valid is an important security parameter in these schemes because one password is valid until the time
period expires and then updated. If a password is infrequently updated, an attacker has a longer
window for exploitation. As the period length grows, the security of OTPs approaches that of
conventional passwords. For example, an eavesdropper could capture the OTP that has just been
generated as it travels across a network. Once captured, the attacker has the entire lifetime of the
password for unauthorized access.
One implementation difficulty of time-based passwords is that the clock of the password generator must
be synchronized with the clock of the authenticator or else a user may be wrongfully denied
authentication. Another concern when utilizing a time-based OTP is clock drift. Clock drift is the
phenomena where different clocks do not run at the same speed and after some time, will not have the
same time value at the same point in time, even if they did previously. Often, the way to reduce
problems with clock drift is to have periodic clock resynchronization or have the authenticator accept a
range of passwords, say two time periods, reducing the security of the system. SecurID is a proprietary
commercial system by RSA Security that uses hardware devices to generate passwords that change
every thirty or sixty seconds [5].
For a concrete example of one such time-based one-time password algorithm, the public algorithm
Time-based One-Time Password (TOTP) is described.
Setup


Establish a shared secret integer



Agree upon a time step

between the authenticator and the user

and an initial time

Authentication


The user calculates

⌊

(

)

⌋
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The user sends the authenticator

(

) where HOTP is a OTP generation algorithm based

upon cryptographic hash functions described below
The authenticator is able to verify that the password is valid as any password generated outside of the
current time step since

will differ. Also, since the shared key is present, the authenticator can be sure

the password was generated by someone in possession of the shared key [6].
Mathematical-based generate passwords that do not have values based on time; instead they are
generated algorithmically each time a password is desired. The authenticator and client’s algorithms are
in step with each other. In many cases, this involves a counter that is incremented each round. Every
time a client is successfully authenticated, the authenticator will only accept the next OTP generated by
the algorithm. Unlike time-based OTPs, mathematically-based OTPs are valid for only one use and are
not vulnerable to the attack described above in which a password is used twice within one period. Also,
clock synchronization and drift are not a concern. One area of concern is if a mathematical-based
password is stolen, it can be valid indefinitely, as long as the real user does not attempt to authenticate,
thus advancing the password the authenticator is expecting.
Implementation issues for these algorithms include keeping the authenticator and client’s algorithms
synchronized. For example, suppose a client’s hardware device presented a password and the user of
this device is unable to correctly enter that number to the authenticator. If the user indicated to the
hardware prematurely that the password was accepted, the user has no way of retrieving the old
password that the authenticator is waiting for. To combat this, often implementations have the
authenticator accept a window of passwords and adjust this window based on the last valid password
entered. S/Key and hash-based OTP (HOTP) are two popular forms of mathematical-based password
generators.
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For a concrete example, S/Key, sometimes known as Lamport’s scheme, is a popular OTP solution
developed to authenticate dumb terminals on Unix-like operating systems [7]. The password generation
is based off a cryptographic hash function.
Setup


Establish a secret key



Apply a cryptographic hash function ( ) to



Discard



The authenticator stores

times

( ) while the clients stores

( )

*

time, the user provides

( )

*

+

Authentication


To be authenticated the



The authenticator computes

(

+

( )) and compares it the stored value on the server:

( )


If the result matches the stored value, discard the stored value and store

( )

For simplicity, the output of the hash function can be mapped to simple English words to facilitate input
into a terminal. This is an example of a solution that has a finite number of uses before re-initialization
of the system must take place. Most implementations forbid this re-initialization from being done
remotely.
Other more modern schemes such as the HOTP do not have this re-initialization limitation. HOTP is built
upon hashed-based message authentication codes (HMAC) and often uses the Secure Hash Algorithm
(SHA-1) for cryptographic hashing [8]. HOTP is published by the Initiative for Open Authentication
(OATH). Conceptually, HOTP calculates the SHA-1 based HMAC keyed with a shared secret on a counter.
The steps to compute a given password with HOTP are:
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Establish a shared secret



Initialize a counter to zero



Define



Let



A client wishing to be authenticated sends



If the authenticator’s value matches the clients, then the client is authenticated



Both parties increment

as an HMAC calculated with SHA-1
be a function that selects 4 bytes in a standard manner
( (

))

As in the case with S/Key, the result is often too large to be entered into a keypad or other device by a
client. Instead of transforming the result into words as in S/Key, HOTP simply calculates the remainder
when divided by the maximum value (

). Many other systems based

upon this approach exist. One could swap out HMAC with the Data Encryption Standard (DES) algorithm,
the Advanced Encryption Algorithm (AES), or any other encryption mechanism. HOTP’s sister standard in
OATH, Time-based One Time Password (TOTP), replaces the counter with the current time, thus
converting the mathematical-based HOTP into a time-based OTP.
Secret Sharing
Secret sharing is a mechanism that allows a secret to be divided into multiple shares, such that when a
certain amount of these shares are combined, the secret can be obtained. For notation, a scheme that
divides a secret into

shares and requires

threshold scheme. An attacker possessing
reconstructing , but anyone in possession of

shares to reconstruct the secret is called a (

)-

shares should have low probability of successfully
shares should efficiently be able to construct with

probability 1 [9]. Simple secret sharing schemes can be divided into two phases, dealing of the secret
and reconstruction of the secret.
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Secret Sharing was described in 1979 independently by Shamir and Blakley and has since triggered
numerous papers describing properties and uses of secret sharing schemes. The canonical use of secret
sharing schemes is to distribute a long term key, such as a private key to a major bank, in a manner that
prevents a single break-in from compromising the entire system. Recently this mechanism has been
used to distribute the long term key signing key of the Domain Name System Security Extensions
(DNSSEC) root zone with a (

)-threshold scheme [10]. In the event of the necessity to generate this

key, 5 of these 7 individuals will have to meet at a base in the United States.
For a concrete implementation of such schemes, this paper will discuss the version presented by Shamir.
Shamir's original secret sharing scheme is the most popular scheme and is often used in most academic
examples and papers on the subject. This scheme works by a dealer defining a polynomial of degree
where the polynomial evaluated at 0 is the secret. The shares are the polynomial evaluated at other
unique points.


Establish a shared secret



Define ( )



The set of shares is {(

where
( ))

*

+} where

is the threshold value

is the number of shares to be made

To reconstruct the secret from only the shares, use the Lagrange polynomial to interpolate the
polynomial from the given points. Once the polynomial has been reconstructed, the shared secret is the
function evaluated again at 0.


Given a set of shares of size , define
and

to be the input to the constructed polynomial above

to be the output of the constructed polynomial for share



Compute



Compute the secret by ∑

∑

where is the index of each share
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Shamir’s scheme is information-theoretic secure. By this, we formally mean that every possible secret is
equally likely after having viewed up to

shares. This prevents an attacker from having a reduced

amount of secrets to guess by observing some of the shares, but not

shares, that have been

compromised. This will be shown later.
Verifiable Secret Sharing
In a conventional secret sharing scheme, a corrupt dealer can deal invalid shares to participants or
malicious users may present an invalid share in an attempt to gain information about the secret. With
these capabilities, a dealer can restrict which sets of shares that can actually reconstruct the correct
secret. There are attacks where an attacker who was not dealt a share initially presents invalid shares to
other participants to prevent them from being able to reconstruct the secret and simultaneously
allowing the attacker to recreate the secret [11].
Verifiable secret sharing (VSS) solves these problems by guaranteeing that even if the dealer is malicious
and delivers corrupt shares to some participants or some participants present an invalid share, there is a
well-defined secret all participants will reconstruct. These schemes often provide a mechanism for
detecting an invalid share with high probability. Thus, a dealer or malicious participant is unable to
present an invalid share without being caught. This is usually accomplished by having the dealer commit
to some information pertaining to the secret and publically release it. Then any participant can verify the
share they received independently by using the public information and the information that they
received. Since the information is public, the participant can be assured that everyone is using the same
information to verify their shares and was not dealt bad information.
Paul Feldman proposed a popular VSS scheme based on homomorphic encryption [12]. The scheme is
non-interactive, meaning bidirectional communication between the participant and the dealer of the
shares is not required. The scheme is not information-theoretic secure as it leaks information about the
8

secret – a non-computationally bound adversary can learn the secret by observing information related
to the VSS procedure. The scheme does have the property that an infinitely powerful dealer is unable to
generate an incorrect share.
A VSS scheme devised by Pedersen is considered the dual of Feldmen’s in the sense that it is in noninteractive and information-theoretically secure [13]. However, in this scheme, if the dealer is not
computationally bound, then he is capable of generating corrupt shares. Pedersen shows the
impossibility of achieving a system which is simultaneously information-theoretic non-interactive and
one in which a non-computationally bound dealer cannot cheat. This means that while maintaining noninteractivity, a verifiable secret sharing scheme either allows non-computationally bounded attackers to
learn information about the secret or allows non-computationally bounded dealers to cheat, but not
both.
Conceptually, Pedersen’s scheme will share a secret using Shamir's secret sharing scheme but also have
the dealer commit to each share while each participant verifies these commitments.


Chose



Define
o

and

large primes such that

the unique subgroup of order , and
It can be tested if an element



The dealer



Chose a



Define (



Chose a random

a generator of

by

wishes to share an
such that nobody knows

( )

) as



publishes a commitment to the secret



constructs a second polynomial of degree

(
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)

: ( )

∑

(

)



(

broadcasts

*

) for

+ and

are the coefficients of ( ) used to

distribute the secret


computes ( ) for



sends participant



Each participant
o

*
(

+
+
( ) for

verifies their share
(

For clarity:
(

*

( )) for

)

*

+ by (
(

)

( ))
(
()

)

∏
)
()

()

The dealer commits to the secret with (
the share with (

) and subsequently commits to the material that generated

). This information, along with other public information such the shares, reveals

no information about the secret but allow participants to verify their share is a portion of the secret.
Proactive Secret Sharing
Generally, secret sharing schemes are designed to protect long term secrets, but if more than

shares

were compromised over this long period of time, the secret is no longer safe. Thus there is a need to
protect the shares over a long period of time. Proactive secret sharing (PSS) is a modification to the
typical secret sharing scheme that allows shares to be updated periodically [14]. A PSS takes a set of
shares and updates them such that attempting to reconstruct the secret with both non-updated and
updated shares fails. PSSs allows up to
an attacker gathers

shares to be leaked within each period between updates. If

or more shares from the same period, the secret is still compromised as in

traditional secret sharing. Stated differently, more than
than

shares can be revealed as long as no more

of those shares are from the same period . This has the effect of reducing the lifetime of the

secret to the length of the period chosen. This makes the length of the period an important security
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parameter. As this length reaches infinity, the scheme becomes less effective, but as the period
approaches 0, precious resources are spent constantly updating the shares.
A PSS scheme presented by Herzberg et. al. uses a modified Shamir secret sharing scheme that requires
all participants

for

*

+ to update the shares every period. The scheme works with Shamir’s

scheme presented above, but after each period is expired, an update process takes place. The update
process involves each participant creating a random polynomial whose free coefficient is 0 (i.e ( )
). Each participant distributes this polynomial evaluated at certain values such that at the end, each
share has been updated correctly by every participant’s function. The update process for a normal
Shamir secret sharing scheme is:


Each participant

*

for

+ generates a

degree polynomial

( ) where

( )


sends



updates his share



( ) securely
by

∑

Old shares and update information are deleted

This scheme clearly shows that the original constructed polynomial ( ) will be replaced with ( )
( )

( ). Since zero was the free coefficient for the polynomials constructed by every

participant, the new polynomial evaluated at 0 is still the original secret: ( )

( )

( )

( ). An attacker attempting to contribute one or more previously compromised shares that have
since been updated will cause the entire reconstruction process to fail as a different polynomial will be
reconstructed.
This PSS is vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack that could lead to a denial of service. An attacker
could realize that an update process was initiated by listening for update material from any participant
and replacing the update material with their own. This technique corrupts the share that is being
11

updated and prevents it from being able to participant successfully in future reconstructions of the
secret.
To corrupt the share, the attacker just needs to send update material that differs from the polynomial
value that was intended for the victim. As the victim’s share replaces the previous version, the share is
permanently corrupted. One or more attackers could repeat this kind attack to a total of
participants. This would destroy the possibility of recreating the secret as there are not enough valid
shares to meet the threshold value required.
For demonstration purposes, if the attacker was a malicious participant, by constructing a
polynomial ( )

( )

, the participant could destroy the secret and prevent successful

reconstruction of the secret. An example of such a corruption is presented below.


Participant

is malicious



generates a

degree polynomial



sends

( ) for

*

( ) where

( )

+

If the malicious participant is successful in having any of the other participants accept the corrupted
update material, the secret not be able to be successfully reconstructed if that participant participates.
The attacker will have successfully launched a denial of service attack on the scheme without violating
any security principles.
In this scheme, there is no method to detect this attacker. VSS schemes such as the one presented
above may be utilized to commit to update material. Participants would not reconstruct the secret when
there is an invalid share present nor would they update their share if the update information was
invalid. The prevention of this attack could also be facilitated by normal cryptographic utilities such as
asymmetric encryption; however this is not information-theoretically secure.
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Proposed OTP solution using Secret Sharing Techniques
Using secret sharing, verifiable secret sharing, and proactive secret sharing, I will present a
mathematical-based OTP solution that is information-theoretically secure. The solution requires three
phases: dealing, reconstruction, and update.

Motivation
The idea of using a shared secret as a form of authentication is nothing new as many schemes use this
already. For instance, static passwords rely on a shared secret between the authenticator and the user
wishing to be authenticated. Using a portion of a shared secret could also be a method of
authentication.
The most important property that arises when using only the portion of a secret as an authentication
mechanism is that the portion is information-theoretic secure. This means that the secret that has been
split is not revealed when seeing only one portion as long as the threshold is greater than one. This is
great for environments like the Internet that require information to be publically viewable to many
users. For this property to be useful the secret must have some intrinsic value that the share does not or
else an eavesdropper would be satisfied capturing the share. Also, since the secret is not available on
any one computer, stealing the secret is more difficult. Once again, this is not important unless the
secret has some value besides authentication, such as a Social Security Number. The property of
information-theoretic secure shares was the driving motivation for investigating the use of secret
sharing for authentication.
Another property of using partial secrets as authentication is their distributed nature. For instance, a
password could be broken up among many people and only when so many are together can
authentication of a group be established. The often used example of launching a nuclear missile
depending on multiple high ranking officials comes to mind.
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Despite these obvious uses, there has not been any research into using secret shares strictly as an
authentication mechanism nor a periodic/temporary authentication mechanism as is the case with onetime passwords. If the share was just delivered to the authenticator as proof of identify, secret sharing
authentication provides no additional protection to traditional passwords. However, used in an OTP
system with changing shares, the properties listed above can be realized. Often time, the techniques
used to construct this secret sharing based OTP come from research that had completely different
visions in mind. For example, the papers that describe updating secrets in a proactive manner had in
mind preventing long term shared secrets, such as private keys, from being compromised. In the case of
an OTP system, updating shares is a great way to generate new passwords. Verifiable secret sharing was
intended to prevent malicious dealers from preventing certain participants from being able to
successfully reconstruct the secret but has in the case of a password system validating update material.

Overview
The user and an authenticator will agree on a shared secret, like a conventional password. This shared
secret will then be split using a (

)-threshold scheme (2 shares requiring both shares to reconstruct

the split secret). The user receives a share and the authenticator receives the other share. Under normal
situations, this process can be happen via the distribution of a smart card or other physical contact. If an
encrypted connection is utilized, the theoretical solution can be compromised unless an informationtheoretic secure encryption mechanism is used. Using the share as the password, the user presents this
to the authenticator. The authenticator uses his share and the user’s share to reconstruct the secret and
compare it to the stored secret. If the secret is successfully reconstructed, the user is successfully
authenticated. After successful authentication, both parties use proactive secret sharing to update the
shares and unlike traditional proactive schemes, the secret is updated as well. Both parties should
invalidate the old shares and secret by securely deleting the material.
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Detail
Expanding on the overview above is a detailed description. The secret sharing techniques verifiable
secret sharing and proactive secret sharing have been tailored to suit an OTP solution. The entire
solution will be proven to be information-theoretic secure in later sections. The setup involves an OTP
generator, which produces passwords, and authenticator, which verifies password, sharing and
communicating information.
Setup
A password generator and authenticator need to setup a shared secret as per Shamir’s classic paper.
Since most of the variables are updated during the update procedure, they will be designated with
superscripts describing the interval in which they are valid. For example, the polynomial

( ) is valid

only for the first password (before the first password is used).


The generator and authenticator agree on two large primes
o

and

such that

divides

will be used in the verification section later



The generator and authenticator agree on a field



Agree on a shared secret



The authenticator constructs a polynomial with coefficients



The generator accepts the share



The authenticator saves the share

( )
( )

of order

( )

where

securely
securely

Use
The password for the generator to present to the user who is to enter it into the authenticator is the
generator’s share.


The user enters

as her password where represents the current interval
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The authenticator uses

and

to reconstruct the polynomial

( )

via

interpolation


( )

The authenticator computes

and compares to the stored secret

Update
The update process changes the last used password into the next. The transformation uses proactive
secret sharing to prevent information about the secret being leaked from previous passwords.


The generator picks



The authenticator picks



The generator computes



The user enters



The authenticator computes



The authenticator presents



The generator constructs the a share



The authenticator constructs a new share



Both parties update the secret



Both parties delete securely all invalid information

in

( )

to construct
in

to construct

( )

( ) and

( )

to the authenticator
( ) and

( )

to the user to enter into the generator

Any future verification operates as described above.
Verification
Currently, an attacker is able to perform a denial of service attack by sending corrupted update material
that destroys shares. This was described on the general description of proactive secret sharing. To
prevent this, digital signatures may be used. By having the authenticator and generator sign their update
material they can accept the update material with the confidence the signing algorithm provides.
Similarly a keyed hash function keyed with the secret may also be used for authentication as non16

repudiation is not needed. However, unless the mechanism is information theoretic secure, this would
still present a vulnerability to an attacker with unlimited computational ability. By breaking the
asymmetric cryptographic scheme or producing collisions in the hash function, an attacker could corrupt
a participant of the OTP scheme’s generated OTP. To correct this denial-of-service vulnerability,
verifiable secret sharing should be used.
Verifiable secret sharing (VSS) is a technique that often uses bit-commitment schemes to ensure that
shares in a secret sharing scheme are valid. Presented below is a modified version of the update scheme
above that uses Pedersen's information-theoretic VSS scheme to commit to the update material.
Conceptually, the generator commits to the update material using the secret. The authenticator is able
to verify the update material because the authenticator is in possession of the secret. The same process
works for the authenticator desiring to commit to the update information intended for the generator.
The outline presented below is in the case of the generator creating information for the authenticator to
verify its update material. The reverse situation will be outlined afterwards.


Define

as the unique cyclic subgroup of

order

where

was agreed upon during

initialization.
o

It can be tested if an element

is contained in



Choose



The parameters



The generator wishes to share



Define a function



The generator constructs a polynomial of degree 1:



The generator outputs a commitment to the secret



The generator outputs

such that nobody knows
and

as (

by

( ). Store these values at initialization time

are parameters defining the system
( )

)

(

)
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( )

for
(

)



The generator outputs



The authenticator verifies

( ) and
( ))

(

is valid by checking whether

(

) is

true.
o

For clarity of the steps:

(

(

)
( )

( )

)

(

)

( ))

(

The same process outlined above when altered slightly can be used when the authenticator is
generating material for the generator to verify. The authenticator would follow the steps, generating a
random polynomial

( ) and sharing

(

)

(

),

and

( ). The

verification of this material by the generator would be accomplished by checking
whether (

( ))

. Note the differences that

that verification does not exponentiate

( ) is evaluated at 1 instead of 2 and

. Once the update material has been verified, then both

parties can update their shares as shown above without worry of corruption.

Worked Example
A worked example is presented below for clarity. This example offers little security as the field chosen is
small and brute forcing the current password is feasible.
Setup
 The generator and authenticator agree two large primes 23 and 11, note that 11 divides


The generator and authenticator agree on a field



Both agree on a shared secret



The authenticator constructs a polynomial



The generator accepts the share



The authenticator saves the share



Let

*

( )

( )
( )

over
(

) securely
(

+, the unique cyclic subgroup of
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)
of order



The authenticator and generator agree on

and

Use
The generator uses the share as the one-time password.


The generator presents



The authenticator uses

as the user’s password
and

to reconstruct the polynomial

( )

via

interpolation


( )

The authenticator computes

(

) and compares it to the secret 3

Update with Verification


The generator picks



The generator computes



The generator picks constructs a random polynomial



The authenticator picks



The authenticator computes



The authenticator picks constructs a random polynomial



The generator outputs

in

( )

to construct
(

( )

in

) and

to construct

( )

(

)

o

(

)

(

)

o



( )

(

)

The authenticator outputs
o

(

o
o
19

over

) and

o

o

)

( )

(

( )

(

( )

)

( )

( )

(
over

)

o


( )

(

)

To verify, the authenticator computes the following and compares the results for equality
o

(

)
(

o

(

)
(

)

)



The authenticator computes the new share



To verify, the generator computes the following and compares the results for equality
o

(

)

(

)



The generator computes the new share



Both participants update their secret



Both participants securely delete all invalid information



The updated shares construct the correct secret 9 as demonstrated by
(

)

)
(

o

(

(
(

)

)

)

This process has been visualized in Figure 1 for understanding purposes. Next time the user wants to be
authenticated, the authenticator must check the newly updated secret instead of the original secret that
they agreed upon at initialization and use the updated shares to reconstruct this newer secret.

20

35
30
25
f0(x)

20

δ10(z)
15

δ20(z)

10

f1(x)

5
0
0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

Figure 1: The functions involved in the update procedure. Note values have not been modulated into
purposes.

for visualization

Security Analysis
The security of the proposed OTP solution depend on the security of Shamir's secret sharing scheme, the
security of proactive secret sharing, and the security of verifiable secret sharing (if it is used). Shamir's
secret sharing scheme is proven information theoretic secure as any set of shares less than the
threshold gives no information on the secret. By adapting the proof for general purpose secret sharing
to that of a scheme with a fixed number of shares (2) and a set threshold (2), showing the security
properties of the OTP scheme follows easily.

Proposed OTP Scheme Proof Outline
To show the security of the one-time password scheme, we need to show that by seeing a password, the
number of possible secrets ( ( )) used in generating that password is unchanged. We show this by
establishing a one-to-one correspondence between the possible functions that could have generated
the observed password and all secrets that were initially possible. Since the functions that could have
generated the share we observed are related to all possible secrets in this correspondence, then any of
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these functions with unique secrets ( ) could have resulted in the generation of the observed
password.

Proposed OTP Scheme Proof
Establish the one-time password scheme by sharing a secret between a generator and an
authenticator. Now suppose an eavesdropper observed the generator’s password generated by ( ).
Let the set


represent all functions that could have resulted in generating this OTP.
* ( )

( )

+

Now we establish a mapping between these functions and the secrets that they represent.


by defining

( ( ))

( )

The first step to show a one-to-one correspondence in this case is to show that the size of
the same, more specifically they are both of size .
there are

and

are

is trivially of size . For , we first notice that

choices for the 0th coefficient which corresponds to ( ). By fixing each possible

coefficient along with the known ( ),

is completely determined because ( ) is a 1 degree

polynomial with 2 known values ( ) and ( ) and can be determined with polynomial interpolation.
Every function is unique because ( ) differs for every function. By construction of
functions based on ( ), we can see this mapping is onto as
where ( )

. Since

and

where we defined

is mapped by the function

are of the same size and the mapping is onto, the mapping is a one-

to-one correspondence.

Update Procedure Proof Outline
Proactive secret sharing is information-theoretically secure as long as seeing the publically exchanged
information does not give any information about the private information used to update the password
or the original secret. To show the security of the update mechanism, we use a similar approach as the
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proof for the password scheme above. We need to show that by seeing the update material, the
number of functions that could have generated that update material still produce every possible value
for the unknown update information that is necessary in updating the password. We show this by
establishing a one-to-one correspondence between the number of functions capable of generating the
revealed update material and all possible values for the hidden material. This will show that seeing the
public update material does not give an advantage into determining the hidden update material as all
possible values for the hidden update material are still possible.

Update Procedure Proof
Establish the one-time password scheme by sharing a secret between an authenticator and a
generator. Now suppose the update phase generate the next password begins. The generator picks a
function

( )

and authenticator picks

update procedure, the generator shares
shares

( )

both over

. As per the

( ) with the authenticator while the authenticator

( ) with the generator. Let an eavesdropper observe this update information in the form of

the ordered pair ( ( )

( )). An attacker needs to be able to determine

password as the used password because the new password is
have already been observed. Let the set

( )

( ) to calculate the next

( )

and

( ) and

represent the set of all functions that could have generated

this pair.


*(

)

( )

( )

( )

( )

( )

( )

+

Note that both these functions share the same value when evaluated at , but an eavesdropper does
not know this value as proven previously. Now we establish a mapping between these functions that
could have generated the observed update material and all the values that
taken.


defined by

((

))

(

( ))
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( ) could have initially

The first step in establishing the one-to-one correspondence is to show that the size of both sets is .
For

, this is trivially true. For , since these functions are of degree 1, 2 points determine the function

by interpolation. That is, if we pick any 2 points, there is only 1 function of degree 1 that passes through
those points. So for the functions in
for that point and all

which are the same when evaluated at zero, there are

choices

choices define unique functions since two unique points are defined for each

function. Thus there are

functions pairs in

and the size of

is . To show that this relation is a one-

to-one correspondence, we only need to show that the mapping in onto (surjective) as both sets are of
order . Pick a number
( ). Let the function
in

, let the function

be the function such that

be the function such that

( )

and

due to our construction of the pairs in . Both sets are of size

( )

( )

and

( ). Both

( )
and

are

and the mapping is onto, thus the

mapping is a one-to-one correspondence.
Initially, an attacker has

choices to guess what value is being added to the password. After seeing the

update material, there are still

choices and thus an attacker has learned nothing about this value. A

similar proof can show that an attacker is unable to determine which value is being added to the
authenticator’s share. No information was learned about
the update material which could be used to interpolate
shows how to enumerate all

because no information was leaked about
. The strategy outlined in the proof however

choices of hidden update material. By fixing the point where both update

functions have the same value (0) and taking one of the update values, the other value is determined
because the polynomial is of degree 1. This could be done for both update function, as well as the secret
splitting function

( ). An attacker could construct a table as below, but this information cannot be

used to determine anything, just enumerate possible values.
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( )

( )

( )

( )

( )

( )

( )

(

( )

)

Table 1: All possible hidden update material for each fixed secret.

This attack cannot be strengthened by observing many passwords and update material as all update
material is completely random each time. This table shows that by seeing all public information, an
attacker still the same number of possible guesses at the next password as before the this information
was revealed.
There should be some note about the secret and the method in which it is updated. Although the shares
are updated by adding random values, the secret is simply multiplied by 3 repeatedly. If 3 is not a
primitive root of the group in which the secret belongs, then the secret will cycle through some
subgroup of

. Even if the secret does cycle through every element of the group, the secret is still

following a cycle and will have the same value at some future point of the scheme. Stronger yet, the
secret will have the same progression of values in the future.
This does not alter the security of the update mechanism. Although an attacker may be able to
determine that secret at some point in time is equal to a previous secret, no information about that
secret was leaked so that all secrets are still possible. An attacker is not able to use this knowledge in an
attempt to determine the private update material, essential for determining the next password. This is
because the shares and update material are chosen independently of the secret and can vary even if the
secret is not. Even if a problem were found regarding this issue, an implementation could be written to
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require re-initialization when a secret would cycle or check the cycle length of a given secret and
determine if it is long enough for the lifetime of the authentication system.
Verification Procedure Proof Outline
This proof will be in the perspective of the generator creating verification material for the authenticator.
The same method can be used to prove the other situation. To prove the security of the verification
( ) and

process, we need to show that by seeing
( )

or

( )

( ) an attacker gains no knowledge of

. We have already shown that
( ) so

information on the secret and is chosen independently from
information to an attacker. Similarly to proving secret sharing,
the rest of

( ) gives no

( ) does not yield any

( ) does not reveal any information on

( ). Thus the security of verifiable secret sharing rests with showing that

and

does not yield any information to an attacker attempting to determine the secret or generate material
that will result in share corruption. We will show this by showing that the function

does not give any

information about its parameters.
Update Procedure Proof
We need to show that the operation (

)

does not reveal information about . The

strategy to show this is to demonstrate that by fixing each possible x input to , all possible output
values in

are possible for some . This will show that for each value outputted by , every possible

could have produced this value for some which is unknown to the attacker. Define a mapping
as ( )

for a fixed . We wish to show that this mapping is a 1-to-1

correspondence, a sort of permutation function of

. We will first show that both sets are of the same

size. Then we will show that the mapping is onto. Trivially
first note that

is of size . To determine the size of

, we

is a multiplicative group of prime power and is thus cyclic. The fundamental theorem

of cyclic groups states that for each divisor

of the order of a cyclic group, there exists a unique cyclic
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subgroup of order . Since
subgroup of order

is a divisor of

, the order of

, we can define

that is proven to exist.

To show the mapping is onto, we need to demonstrate that for every
that ( )

. First we observe that

produce any element of
of

be the unique such

by taking

that can be expressed as

which is simply some member of

is a generator of

, there exists

such

by construction. This means that we can

to some power. Similarly,

which is fixed, is also some member

. So we can express ( ) by ( )

for some

. Since we can generate any value of

picking certain , we can generate any element of

as

to be the sum of

,
by

is a generator.

We have shown that by picking certain , ( ) can construct any member of

, thus ( ) is onto. Since

( ) is onto and the codomain and domain are of the same size, ( ) is a 1-to-1 correspondence. A
similar proof can be done to show that (

) does not reveal any information about . Since none of

the public information reveals insight into determining any of the private information, the verification
process does not weaken the scheme, but does prevent a certain denial-of-service attack.

Implementation
Communication
The biggest issue with implementing this OTP scheme is the communications required. The client
wishing to be authenticated has to give some information to the authenticator between each use. This is
not desirable as OTPs primary use case is as a personal identification number for bank machines and
other such physical authentication scenarios where communication is limited. One way an
implementation may deal with this issue is by generating a finite number of shares by following the
protocol above, and having the client wishing to be authenticated and the authenticator store all OTPs
and use the current OTP whenever authentication is desired. This is not unlike older methods of writing
sequences of numbers or words on a sheet of paper and crossing of used passwords. The information
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theoretic advantages of the scheme still remain intact as an eavesdropper is unable to predict the next
OTP by seeing previous OTPs, unlike pseudo-random number generators or other OTP schemes.
As with most cryptosystems, distribution of secret keys is difficult. The same problems face the
proposed one-time password system. The secret material is the shared key, initial share, and any other
information needed for the verification process. Secure methods of secret material distribution would
be best achieved if accomplished by using physical contact to authenticate the user who will use the
system. This kind of situation would be common in a corporate environment where the one-time
password solution is utilized for physical access. If the distribution of the secret material were to happen
remotely or with poor authentication techniques of the user, then the whole system could be
compromised. Even if face-to-face or voice-based authentication mechanisms are used, attackers could
use social engineering techniques and care must be taken.

Storage Requirements
Avoiding communication by storing many OTPs can cause storage requirement issues, especially on
limited resource devices such as smart cards. The amount of storage required is dependent on the OTP
size and the number of stored OTPs for future use. Since these numbers are finite and fixed at system
setup, the amount of storage required is known in advance and simple to compute. In fact, the amount
of storage as OTPs are used decreases; however this does not appear to be advantageous to limited
resource devices. The amount of storage required is the size of the password multiplied by the number
of passwords. 128 bits is often used as a strong key space to prevent brute force attacks [15]. For one
authentication per day for a year,

bits, or 45.5 kibibits, of storage are required. If

3 128 bit OTPs were generated daily for 80 years, only 10.7 mebibytes of storage are required.
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If communication is possible and the storage of keys is not required, only nominal space is required for
the share,

and other similar information. Unfortunately a device in this class of capabilities in

terms of communication is probably less resource constrained in terms of storage.

Computational Requirements
The OTP scheme consists of polynomial evaluation, polynomial interpolation, and basic arithmetic
operations. The evaluation of polynomials using Horner’s method uses

multiplications and

additions

for an -degree polynomial [16]. Polynomial interpolation such as Lagrange interpolation is not
computationally expensive, but since the proposed one-time password scheme only involves
interpolating and evaluating lines, Lagrange interpolation is not required. To construct a more efficient
interpolation method for lines, manipulate the point-slope formula
values

and

are always known as

(

)

(

). The

and respectively. By plugging in the values for these

variables, the formula to evaluate the line represented by two points at

becomes ( )

which consists of only three addition operations. This formula was used to construct Table 1 above.
After initial setup, the use of the one-time password requires:
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,

Process

Operations Required

Performed By

Addition

Multiplication

Authenticator

Generator

Polynomial Interpolation

3

0

X

Polynomial Evaluation

2

2

X

X

Polynomial Addition

4

0

X

X

Table 2 : Computational requirement breakdown

The addition and multiplication operations to support the proposed scheme, however, must take place
on numbers larger than most current machine’s native word sizes, often 128 bits or more each. If
verifiable secret sharing is used to authenticate the update material, then more computation is
required. The polynomials ( ) for both the authenticator and generator need to be evaluated once,
commitments to

and

computed, and the update material verified. These values differ for the

authenticator and generator.
Reason

Operations Required

Process

Evaluation

Generator

Authenticator

Addition

Multiplication

Exponentiation

( )

( )

2

2

0

0

2

4

0

2

4

0

2

4

2

4

1

4

12

13

(

)

(

)

Commitment
(

)

( ( ) ( ))

(

)

( ( ) ( ))

Verification

Total

Table 3 : Requirements for computing update shares when verification is used.

Table 3 shows that even with verification, the amount of computation is small and does not require
sophisticated operations.
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Random Source and Distribution
The proposed one-time password solution frequently requires random number for polynomial
construction. During initialization, one random number is needed to construct the secret sharing
polynomial. During update, two random numbers are needed to construct the update polynomials for
the authenticator and generator. If the update material is verified, two more random numbers are
required per round and two more random numbers at initialization time. So there needs to be at most
bits of random information at initialization and

bits per round for an

bit password system.

As with all cryptographic systems, if the random number source is predictable in any way, then the
security of the system is compromised.

Comparison to other OTP solutions
Disadvantages
Communication
During the update phase of the proposed OTP solution, the authenticator and the entity being
authenticated need to exchange some update material. This can be implemented either interactively by
having the authenticator and authenticated entity communicate over a bidirectional channel or by
having the update material generated during the initialization phase and stored for later use.
Sometimes it is infeasible to require a bidirectional communication. An example of this situation could
be hardware tokens that do not have any input mechanism or networking capabilities. If the hardware
token were a programmable smart card or a computer program, this is less of a problem as input
mechanisms are available in these situations.
If the update material was generated at initialization time, then the OTP solution is only valid for a
predetermined number of uses. S/KEY also has a finite lifetime before a re-initialization period is
required. The specification requires that some secure method of re-initializing the secret be establishes
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[7]. If such a re-initialization method is provided, there still must be storage for the pre-computed OTPs
because, unlike S/KEY, all OTPs are needed in advanced.
The amount of material that must be exchanged between each use depends on the size of the secret
material. Each round must exchange the password, the update material, and the verification material.
The password, update material, and some of the verification material is all of the same size. However,
some of the verification material, namely
than

in size instead of . Since

Assuming they are all less than
each direction,
such as

, this is

and

and

can be bigger as they are restricted to being less

are chosen, the amount of difference can be controlled.

bits in size, the scheme takes no more than

bits of information in

bits of information in total each round. For normal symmetric security bit sizes
bytes per round.

Advantages
Security
The proposed one-time password scheme is unique among one-time password schemes because of the
information theoretic properties. Most schemes typically use a keyed-hash or encryption algorithms on
a moving factor, typically a counter or timestamp. This technique does not provide security against an
attacker with unlimited computational power who could use the unlimited computational resources to
determine the moving factor by finding collisions with the hash algorithm or decrypting the password. In
either case, the secret material used to generate the password can be discovered and future valid
passwords can be generated. By using Shamir's secret sharing techniques, an eavesdropper gains no
knowledge of the secret material that the OTPs are based upon. Even with unlimited computational
power and previously utilized passwords, an attacker is unable to generate passwords that will be valid
in the future. The only attack on a future password is brute force, trying all possible passwords. This kind
of attack is very noisy and easily detectable by the authenticator. Systems such as SSH and other remote
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logon systems prevent this by disallowing so many authentications in a set time period, and even
preventing the offending IP address from ever logging in.
The security is similar to one-time pads with a subtle difference, when attempting to decrypt a
ciphertext that was encrypted with a one-time pad, each possible decryption is likely. The same is true
for each future one-time password; however, the authenticator will tell an attacker if his guess is correct
or not. Attackers of one-time pads would have to guess based on the decryption whether the correct
key was used.
The S/KEY and mOTP schemes use cryptographic hash functions (CHF) as their building blocks. CHFs are
designed to prevent collisions, pre-image, and second pre-image attacks often by building upon hard
problems. This means that the output of a CHF reveals some information about the message being
hashed. Taking advantage of this leaked information is considered difficult now, but techniques to
determine this obscured secret may exist in the future. One-time passwords that rely on CHFs for
security in turn are revealing information that could be used to construct valid passwords for future use.
HOTP and TOTP are OTP solutions that are built upon Hash-based Message Authentication Code
(HMAC), a message authentication code built upon a CHF in such a way to mitigate extension attacks.
Despite HMAC's proven resistance to many modern attacks upon the CHF in which it is based, HMACs do
leak information about the underlying method used in the construction of the HMAC [17].
Computation
The proposed OTP scheme is very computationally inexpensive and readily available to install on smart
cards and other resource constrained devices. Although has functions are designed to be extremely
efficient, they still often require many rounds of inexpensive operations. Public key systems that are
used in authentication are extremely expensive computationally and require many bits of information.
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As discussed earlier, the proposed scheme is computationally inexpensive and suitable for use in
resource constrained devices.

Future Work
The proposed password system is a first in the area of utilizing secret sharing techniques as an
authentication mechanism. There are variations to this scheme such as multiple participants using
multiple shares to authenticate a group that require additional research.
A hurdle to this password scheme adoption is implementation. The appendix outlines current
implementations of the scheme, but there needs to more implementations that will be adopted by large
corporations for the scheme to become a success. Future implementations may wish to consider
methods to improving the ease of use of the system. For instance, a current transaction requires typing
multiple unique hexadecimal numbers. This is not comfortable for most people. Translating the
passwords and other numbers into words as S/Key does may be worth looking into. As with any
authentication scheme, it should be well defined in a standard or presented in a manner to comply with
existing standards to promote multiple implementations that successfully operating together.

Conclusion
A one-time password scheme based upon techniques developed for secret sharing techniques has been
presented. The security of the system has been shown to be information-theoretically secure. This
means that by seeing previous rounds of the password system, an adversary seeing all public
information is unable to reduce the set of future possible passwords. This contrasts with previous
password systems where a computationally unbounded adversary is able to determine future
passwords. The computation and storage requirements of the passwords system have been shown to be
low enough for resource constrained devices to implement such a system, which is typical for one-time
password systems that are often implemented on a dedicated hardware token. Multiple
34

implementations of the system are described in the appendix and are demonstrations of the systems
practicality.
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Appendix
C Library
A library implementing the proposed one-time password solution has been developed in hopes of
promoting its use. The library works on the basis of profiles. Each profile corresponds to a participant of
the authentication system, so every user has a profile that represents a relationship between a certain
authenticator and that user. If the user authenticates with more than one authenticator, they will have
multiple profiles. The same holds true for the authenticator. The authenticator has a profile for each
user that they authenticate. The library creates these profiles and loads them to compute the password,
verify the password, update the shares, and verify the shares. Documentation of the library is provided
digitally.
The library comes with example programs designed to be run as command line applications for simple
experimentation. A simple usage of these command line applications is as follows:


A user would be given a profile generated by the authenticator:
o



The authenticator would generate his share also:
o



./shamir-load-profile user-profile authenticator-profile

The user could generate a password:
o



./shamir-create-profile user-profile

./shamir-generate-otp user-profile

The authenticator could check the password :
o

./shamir-check-otp authenticator-profile otp

The last two commands require communication of the update and verification material. This is done via
standard input.
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PAM Module
To allow authentication via native applications already written, a PAM module was written that utilizes
the C library described above. By providing a PAM module, applications such as login in environments
that use PAM are capable of utilizing the proposed scheme to authenticate users.
To use the PAM module, the pam module must be compiled and installed properly. Compilation
generates a shared library that in most distributions should be placed in /lib/security. This
process should be taken care of by the build system. Once properly installed, the application that wishes
to use the one-time password scheme for authentication must edit a configuration file specific for that
application that PAM uses. These configuration files are usually located in
/etc/pam.d/application where application is the name of the application. The file should
include a line that tells PAM to use the module.
auth required shamir_otp
For each user that wishes to be authenticated with the system, a configuration file must be placed in
/etc/init.d/

Android Application
Since most one-time password solutions require a hardware token, time to market is often very long. To
reduce the difficulty of introducing this one-time password system to a user base, an Android
application was written. Android is a mobile phone operating system that has become very popular
recently. The application allows the hardware token to be replaced by the user’s cell phone or other
Android device while still satisfying the something you have property of multi-factor authentication. The
application is straight forward to use, but is unable to provide the convenience of loading profiles from
files as the C library is. This just means that the user has to manually enter the contents of this file; this is
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demonstrated in Figure 2. The actual presentation of the password from the generator to the user is
demonstrated in Figure 3.

Figure 2: The preparation of the generator for use in the password system.

Figure 3: The generation of a password along with update and verification material.
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Glossary
Android - A mobile operating system based upon Linux and developed by Google Inc.
Hash chain - A successive application of a cryptographic hash function.
HMAC - Hash-based Message Authentication Code. An algorithm that computes a message
authentication code by utilizing cryptographic hash functions and a secret key.
Homomorphic encryption - A form of encryption where a specific algebraic operation performed on the
plaintext is equivalent to another (possibly different) algebraic operation performed on the ciphertext.
HOTP - HMAC-based One-Time Password. A one-time password algorithm specified by OATH that
utilizes a message authentication code and a counter to construct passwords.
Lagrange polynomial - The least degree polynomial that interpolates points using a technique named
after Joseph Lagrange.
Lamport’s scheme - See S/Key
MAC - Message Authentication Code. An piece of information used to authenticate and verify the
integrity of a message. MACs do not provide non-repudiation.
MFA - Multifactor authentication. Authentication that happens on two or more independent factors of
authentication.
mOTP - Mobile One-Time Password. A one-time password algorithm designed to be implemented on
mobile devices.
OATH - Open Authentication. A group that publishes documents specifying authentication mechanisms.
One-Time Password - A temporary password that is often used in a multi-factor authentication system.
PAM - Portable Authentication Module. A software library that allows applications to hand off the
process of authentication to a dedicated library.
Polynomial interpolation - The process of constructing a polynomial which goes exactly through given
points.
Proactive secret sharing - Secret sharing that utilizes certain techniques to allow shares to be updated in
such a way that prevents non-updated and updated shares from reconstructing the secret.
S/Key - A one-time password system developed for dumb terminals that uses a hash chain to construct
passwords.
Secret sharing - The act of creating multiple shares from an initial secret in such a way that the shares
can be combined to generate the secret.
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Share - A portion of the secret that under some circumstances with other shares reconstruct that secret.
Threshold - The number of shares in a secret sharing scheme that are required to reconstruct the secret.
TOTP - Time-based One-Time Password. A one-time password algorithm specified by OATH that utilizes
a message authentication code and the current time to construct time-based passwords.
Verifiable secret sharing - Secret sharing that utilizes certain techniques to allow share receivers to
verify that the shares they are receiving are not corrupt or maliciously crafted.
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